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I.

Int rod uct ion

It is wid ely tho ugh t tha t inco me
dis trib uti on wor sen ed dur ing
the eco nom ic gro wth whi ch too k
pla ce in Bra zil dur ing the 196
0's. Thi s
con ten tion is har dly und ocu men
ted. At lea st fou r stu die s by
res pec ted
dev elop men t eco nom ists
Fis hlo w [7] , Lan gon i [10 ], Ade
lman and Mo rris [ 1 ],
and Che ner y et. al [4]
pre sen t dat a sup por ting thi s con
clu sio n. Fis hlo w,
for exa mpl e, rep ort s an inc rea
se in the Gin i coe ffic ien t from
0.5 9 to 0.6 3
and a ris e in the inco me sha re
of the ric hes t 3.2% from 27% to
32%.
In my pap er ,rA Re- exa min atio n
of Bra zili an Economic Dev elop men
t
in the 196 0' s" [5] , whi ch I sub
seq uen tly rev ise d and ret itle d
"Who Ben efit s
from Economic Dev elop men t? --A Re- exa min atio n of Bra zili an
Growth in the
196 0s" [6] , I fou nd tha t the ent
ire inco me dis trib uti on shi fte d,
ben efit ing
eve ry inco me cla ss, the pro por
tion of the eco nom ical ly act ive
pop ula tion
wit h inco mes belo w the pov erty
lev el (as def ine d by Bra zili an
sta nda rds )
dec line d dur ing the dec ade , tho
se who rem aine d poo r wer e les s
poo r tha n
bef ore in abs olu te term s, and
the rat e of gro wth of inco me amo
ng "th e poo r"
was at lea st as gre at as the rat
e of gro wth among the non -po or.
From the se
fin din gs, I con clu ded tha t "th
e poo r" did ben efi t from Bra zili
an eco nom ic
gro wth in the 196 0's.
The se res ult s came as a sur pri
se to me, and so I did not exp
ect
tha t my con clu sio n --- tha t Bra
zil seem ed to do bet ter on the
inco me dis 
trib uti on fro nt tha n many obs erv
ers had ori gin ally tho ugh t --wou ld be
rec eiv ed unc riti cal ly by oth ers
. On the oth er han d, nei the r
did I exp ect
to rec eiv e cri tic al com men tari
es bef ore the pap er had eve n bee
n pub lish ed.
Alr ead y, thr ee cha llen ges hav e
bee n issu ed and cir cul ate d by
Pro fes sor s
Por ter [11 ] and Bac ha [3] and
Doc tors Ahl uwa lia, Dul ay, and
Pya tt [2]. Eac h

2.

challenge is thoughtful and imaginative.

Each performs new calculations

concerning the distribution of income in Brazil in 1960 and 1970.

And each

fundamentally disagrees with my conclusion on the distribution of the
benefits of Brazilian economic growth.
In what follows, I hope to convince the reader that my point
that the poor shared in Brazilian economic growth in the 1960's --- is
robust to these criticisms and that the alternative position has not been
substantiated.

Nevertheless,

there continues to be a great deal of severe

poverty in Brazil, which my study in no way tries to condone.

I hope

the reader will interpret what follows in that light.

II.

What the Re-examination Does and Does Not Re-examine
Let me begin by stating what I did.!}£! try to do.
First and foremost, I should make clear that I have not challenged

the legitimacy of any of the underlying figures on income distribution used
by previous writers.

I have used Fishlow's figures in preference to Langoni's

for both a practical and a substantive reason.

The practical reason is that

Fishlow's study has been more widely-cited and his data more widely-used
than those of Langoni,at least among English-speaking economists.

The

substantive reason is that Langoni excluded from consideration those persons
in the economically active population with zero incomes, while Fishlow
included them.

For purposes of understanding the effect of growth on income

distribution, I wanted to see whether growth reduced the rate of open
unemployment and drew more of the population into the cash income sector.
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Hence, I chose to use Fishlow's data, which allows measurement of change
of the zero income population.
Second, I have not challenged any of the calculations of relative
income inequality indices.

I accept the reports by Fishlow, Langoni, and

others that relative income inequality increased (whether measured by the
Gini coefficient, income share of the richest x%, decile shares, or some
other index).

Where I differ with existing studies is over the appropriate

ness of the class of relative inequality measures as a whole for studying
changing income distributions in growing economies.

I return to this

point below.
Third, my re-examination should not be understood as in any way
attempting to justify the types of political measures adopted in Brazil
toward the objective of economic recovery and growth.

I have stated my

position clearly in both versions of the paper and see no need to repeat
it here.
Finally, I have not tried to speculate on what would have happened
had Brazil followed some other type of development strategy.

The task of

chronicling how the income distribution might have been affected (for
better or worse)

had some alternative policies been pursued is best

left to others more expert on the Brazilian economy than I.
Let me now say what I did try to do.

The task I set for myself

was to describe how income distribution did in fact change.

My question

was: who benefited from economic development, or more precisely, how did
the income position of the poor change as compared with the non-poor?

In

answering this questio~ past studies of Brazil followed upon the Nobelprize winning tradition of Professor Kuznets and used relative income measures.

Consequentl y, when those authors concluded that income distributio n in
Brazil worsened, theirs was a relativistic statement based on the full
range of observed incomes.

In contrast to the accepted tradition, I

chose to use a methodology based on absolute poverty

rather than relative

incomes, and therein lies the essence of my re-examinat ion and the qualita
tive difference between my results and those of earlier researchers .

I

accept their facts on changes in relative income inequality, but do not
share in their interpretat ion, since I give greater weight in my judgment
to other facts (those concerning absolute poverty) which previous studies
overlooked.

III.

What the Controversy is All About
None of the commentator s on my paper has taken issue with the

absolute poverty approach per se.

All appear willing to define a constant

real poverty line and to examine changes in the numbers of persons above
or below the line and the average absolute incomes received by eacho

Thus,

agreement seems to have been reached on the validity of the absolute poverty
approach in principle.
At issue is how well I have executed the absolute poverty approach
in practice.

The principal objection raised in the commentarie s concerns

the correctness of the procedure I followed for interpolatin g incomes
. h"in an income
.
wit
c 1ass. l

1

The problem I was faced with and had to resolve

I think the commentator s 8re entirely justified in calling my data
approximati ons into question. We should assess the suitability of data and
the appropriate ness of estimation procedures far more often than we do.

5

was the fact that none of the sources of income distribution data for
Brazil (whether those of Fishlow, Langoni, Jain, or whomever) had comparable
income brackets for 1960 and 1970.

In other words, taking the poverty line

as NCr. $2,100 in 1960 units, and allowing for an inflation factor of 3.53,
it was impossible to obtain an exact figure for the percentage of the
population below NCr. $7,413 (= $2,100 x 3.53) from any published source.
In the absence of the microeconomic data, I was forced to approximate the
share of the population below this amount and also to estimate their income
share.

The interpolation procedure I adopted applied a linear approximation

to the population frequency within each bracket.

For example, the first

positive income bracket in 1970 runs from Oto 2.8 constant NCr.$.

Applying

the linear approximation, 2.1/2.8 of the population in the 0-2.8 category
was assigned to the 0-2.1 category and the remaining O. 7/2.8 to the next
higher category.
In retrospect, this was a rather poor way to go about it.
· conclusion in the original version (p. 10) was that
poor' grew at a rate double that of the 'non-poor'"•
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My

the incomes of 'the
In his comment [11],

Professor Porter observed that my interpolation procedure assigned the
average income in that category to all persons within that bracket.

Since

the poorer x% must have received less than the richer x%, Professor Porter
concluded (rightly) that I had overstated the income gains of "the poor."
Consequently, the conclusion in the original draft that the growth rate
of incomes among the poor was double that of the non-poor was too strong,
since the true figure was necessarily lower.
The question that naturally arose then was how great was the bias
introduced by my interpolation procedure.

As I shall show below, if we
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accept the legitimacy of Fishlow's data, it is impossible for the alterna
tive conclusion --- that the poor may have benefited proportionately less
than the non-poor --- to be the case under any set of assumptions or
interpolation procedures.
It is probably worth repeating that what we have here is a
disagreement over how to best approximate the necessary figures with
inadequate data, not a conceptual disagreement on how to treat the ideal
data.

The data problem could easily be resolved if we had either a public

use sample with the microeconomic data or a special tabulation of the
income distribution conformable to Fishlow's (or Langoni's) definitions.
Unfortunately, we do not.

IV.

Income Growth of the Poor and A Proof of the Impossibility of the
Alternative Conclusion Using Fishlow's Data
The purpose of this section is to establish the following result:
If we accept the validity of the income distribution data presented

in Fishlow [7], the poor must have received income gains at least as great
as those of the non-poor.

Under no set of assumptions can the alternative

conclusion --- that the poor may have benefited proportionately less than
the non-poor --- be sustained.
The proof goes along the following lines.

I had assumed that

incomes within the lowest positive income bracket were equally distributed.
This is clearly one extreme assumption.

The other alternative extreme

assumption is that incomes within that bracket are distributed as
unequally as possible.

I shall show that even under this most extreme

alternative assumption, the poor could not have received a smaller percentage
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income increase than the non-poor.
Proof: In my work, I assumed that the poorest 75% of the econ
omically active population in the 0 - 2.8 category received 75% of that
group's income.

In objecting to that assumption, Professor Porter

illustrated a situation where the richest 25% in the 0 - 2.8 bracket are
assumed to receive 50% of that group's income and the poorest 75% receive
the other 50%0

He calculated that the average earnings of the poor would

rise by only 3%, while those of the non-poor would rise by 31%.
example, if valid, would destroy my earlier conclusions.

This

Let me now prove

the impossibility of Porter's example.
The following data for 1970 are derived from Fishlow's original
11

data, reproduced in Table 1 of

A Re-examinationoo••":

Undeflated
Income
Bracket

Mean Income
in Bracket,
Undeflated

Deflated
Income
Bracket

Mean Income
in Bracket,
Deflated

None

(0/11. 7%) = 0

None

0

1 - 100

(8. 0%/31. 7%)

X

2580 1 = 65.04

0 - 2.83

1. 84

101 - 150

(6. 2%/12. 8%)

X

258.1 = 124.92

2. 83 - 4. 25

3.54

151 - 200

(10.6%/15.6%)

4. 25 - 5.66

4. 96

X

258.1 = 175.25

Mean incomes within brackets are calculated as the income share of that group
as a fraction of population share multiplied by mean income.
The first two columns are deflated by 35.32 to be comparable with
1960 data.

(See footnote 1, p. 6, of "A Re-examination••• " or footnote 2,

p. 7 of rrWho Benefits ••• ")

If the richest 25% of the 0 - 2.83 group were

to receive 50% of the income, their income total would equal 50% x 1.84 x
31. 7% P

= 29.2% P.

Since total income is 7.31 P, their share is

(29.2%P)/7.31 P = 3.99%.

If 7.925% (=25% x 31. 7%) of the population·
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receives 3.99% of the income and the mean is 7.31, the mean of the richest
25% of the 0 - 2.83 group is then

7. 31 (3. 99%)
7. 925%

upper limit of their category (2.83).

=

3.68, which exceeds the

Thus, it is impossible for the

richest 1/4 to receive as much as 1/2 the income in their bracket, as in
Professor Porter's example.
How much can they possibly receive?

Let a equal the maximum share

of the O - 2.83's income which could be received by the richest 25% within
that category.

The richest 25%' s income is given by a(l. 84) (31. lo/c,P)

2.83 (1/4 x 31. 7%P).

Solving, we find a= .3845.

=

Thus, the richest 25%

within that bracket could receive at most 38.45% of that bracket's income,
and the remaining 75% of the people would receive 61.55% of the income.
The poorer 75% in that bracket would than have a mean income of
• 6155 (. 5832P)
75% (31. 7% P)

= 1.51.

From these data, we may compute the mean income of the .poorest
35a5% of the population, under the assumption that the richest 25% of those
in the O - 2a83 bracket earn at the maximum of the bracket.
-70 Min
yp

=

23. 775%
35.475%

X

We find

1.51 = 1.01.

The superscript Min denotes that this is the minimum possible value of yp 70
under the maintained assumptions.

for

-70Max
Yn

Turning now to the non-poor,

we have
'

35.475% P
. - 70Max
from which we obtain y_
n

70

(1.01) + 64.525% P

=

10. 77.

70

yn

70

9.

For 1960, yp

60

=

-

• 78 and yn

-

60

-

70

yp

=

8. 30.

Hence,

=

1.01
• 78
• 78

=

30%,

10. 77 - 8. 30
8. 30

=

30%,

60

yp
- 60

Yp

and
a

-

and the percentage increases are exactly equal.
From these calculations, we find that it is impossible for the
poor to have received a smaller percentage income increase than the nonpoor, given that the richest 25% in the O - 2.83 range are assumed to
receive the maximum allowable income in that bracket.
Of course, there is nothing sacred about the selection of 25% as
the upper income group.

More generally, we may ask: if we assume the

greatest possible inequality within the O - 2.83 bracket, could the poorest
37.0% (which corresponds to the percentage below the poverty line in 1960)
possibly receive less income in 1970 than in 1960?
the answer is negative.

Let us define

Q

It is easily shown that

as the maximum share of the

0 - 2.83's income which could be received by the richest
.

1.849

= 2.830.

is when 9

~

0

percent.

Then,

Q

or

0 = 1.54.

1, and therefore

The most unequal possible income distribution

0 ->

.649; the remaining 35.1% of the

persons in that bracket would receive nearly zero incomes.

Thus, with the

greatest possible inequality within the O - 2.83 category, the 1970 income
distribution would be

Income

% of Population

0

11. 7%

0

35. 1%

X

31. 7%

=

11.1%

2. 83

64.9%

X

31. 7%

=

20.6%

> 2. 83

56.6%

The.minimum value of the income received by the poorest 37.0% equals
2.83 x (37.0% - 22.8%) P, and their minimum share is this figure divided
by total income (7.31 P).

This minimum share is 5.49o/~

Hence, under the

most extreme assumption, the income share of the poorest 37.0% definitely
did not fall in Brazil between 1960 and 1970, and appears to have risen
by 0.3o/~

Since real national income per capita rose by 32%, the real

incomes of the poorest 37.0% rose by at least 40%. (( 5

5;;

x 1.32) - 1).

Furthermore, the more equal the distribution of income within the O - 2.83
bracket, the greater the percentage income gain of the very poorest during
the economic growth of Brazil in the 1960's.

Thus, it could not be that the

incomes of the poor grew more slowly than those of the non-poor.
Q. E. D.

V.

On the Inconsistency Between Actual Income Distribution Data and
Fitted Data and the Conclusions Therefrom.
In their comments [2] Ahluwalia, Duloy, and Pyatt (hereafter

A-D-P) purported to show that even the softened conclusion --- that the
poor had income gains at least as great as the non-poor --- was incorrect.
Their arguments follow along two lines:
(1) A critique of the particular interpolation assumptions I made,
and (2) the results of an analysis based on fitted Lorenz curves.
already considered their first point in the last section.

I have

This section
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concerns their second point.
A-D-P make use of data calculated by Shail Jain [8].

These data

pertain not to the actual income distribution but rather to a fitted dis
tribution, based on a procedure for estimating Lorenz curves from grouped
data suggested by Kakwani and Podder [9].

A-D-P find

radically
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different estimates of the growth of income of the poor.

[A-D-P' s]

estimate implies that the mean income of the poor rose from 77.63 in 1960
to 82.67 in 1970

an increase of 6.5 percent compared to an increase

in mean income of 32 percent.

Against this, [Fields'] estimate implies

an increase in mean income of the poor of 62 percentl"
After a careful review of the A-D-P calculations, I am convinced
that the data fitted by Jain do in fact imply the conclusions A-D-P have
drawn.

Let us recall, however, that the Jain data used by A-D-P are

estimates.

I will now show that the estimated data systematically under

state the actual growth in mean income among the pooro
(i) As compared with the actual income distribution, A-D-P over
state the income of the poor in 1960.
Proof: In 1960, the poor (defined as those with incomes less than
Cr$ 2. 1) actually received 5.2% of total income.
population had incomes below that level.
poorest 38% received 5. 75% of the incomeo

In fact, 37.0% of the

Next, A-D-P estimate that the
This means that the 38th

percentile is estimated to have received 0.55% of the income.

However, the

next 14o4% of the population received 7.0% of the income, or less than 0.5%
per percentile.

Thus, the income of the poor in 1960 was overstated.

(ii) As compared with the actual income distribution, A-D-P under
state the income of the poor in 1970.
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Proof: In 1970, the poorest 43.4% of the population received 8.0%
A-D-P estimate that 6.0% of the income was received by the

of the income.
poorest 40o/~

Hence, the 3.4% of the population between 40.0% and 43.4% are

estimated to have received 2.0% of the income, or approximately 0.65% per
percentile.

Since that income bracket included 12.8% of the population who

received 6.2% of the income, this estimate implies that the remaining 9.4%
of the people at the upper end of that income bracket must have received
4.2% of the income, which gives an average of about 0.45% of the income
per percentile.

Thus, according to their estimates, the poorer people in

the 101-150 bracket are estimated to have received incomes which are 50%
higher than the incomes received by the richer persons in that bracket,
which is clearly impossible.
(iii) From (i) and (ii), it follows that the data used for the
A-D-P calculations understate the growth of income of the poor in Brazil
between 1960 and 1970.

Q.E.D.

The difficulties encountered with these data derived from the
fitted Lorenz curve call into question the estimating procedure itself.
As mentioned above, A-D-P's estimates are based on figures calculated by
Jain [8] using the procedure of Kakwani and Fodder [9], hereafter referred
to as K-P.

Without going through K-P's methodology, the precision of the

values calculated by Jain is subject to doubt for the following reasons:
(i) K-P present four methods for estimating Lorenz curves.
simplest method (Method I) utilizes ordinary least squares (OLS).

Their

It is

apparent from the Lorenz curve itself that the assumption of homoscedasticity
in OLS is not likely to be fulfilled, which would render the OLS estimates
inefficient, although still consistent.

Yet, this inefficient procedure
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(with correspondingly larger errors in estimation) is the procedure used
by Jain and accepted by A-D-P, which might explain part of the inconsis
tency between the actual and income fitted distributions.
(ii) A second difficulty is that the Jain computations are based
.

•.

"-\."· •-

on decile groupings.

.,.

I

Yet, their accuracy is called into question by K-P s

observation of income groups from 11 to 20 improves the accuracy of the
technique."

This, of course, pinpoints the whole issue that what goes on

within. certain deciles (the third and fourth) is critical to the calculations.
(iii) Most importantly, even the most efficient of the K-P
procedures (Method IV) does not do a very good job of predicting the
incomes at the extreme lower end of the distribution, which is the concern
in Brazilo

Based on 11 groups, K-P estimate the share of the poorest 5%

in Australia as .5857% of total income, when in fact they received. 767%,
a percentage differential of some 20o/~

Thus, despite the goodness of fit

2
(as measured by R s in the neighborhood of 0.99) for the Jain regressions
for all 81 countries, the particular prediction associated with the value
pop. = 5% is in error by a rather large amount.

Might predictions of the

income shares at the lower ends in Brazil not also be in error by similar
orders of magnitude?
In sunnnary, the claim by A-D-P that the growth of incomes in
Brazil among the poor was less than among the non-poor is based on data
fitted hy a procedure which we have reason to believe is not very precise
and which furthermore has h~en shown to be inconsistent with actual data on
at least two counts.

Since small errors in the overall fit might well make

large differences in the particular values with which we are concerned, and
since the fitted data differ considerably from the actual data in a systematic
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fashion supportive of the A-D-P result, it does not appear that the A-D-P
claim has been decisively established nor my conclusion convincingly
refuted.

VI.

On Comparing the Poor and the Non-Poor.
A somewhat different sort of critique is that of Professor Bacha

[3].

Bacha accepts my calculations concerning the growth in average

incomes among the poor as compared with the non-poor, but disagrees with
my interpretation.

His critique consists of two main points which I shall

try to refute below.

He writes:

(1) "Dividing up the economically active population in three
equivalent income intervals, we characterize the process of income concen
tration in Brazil during the sixties by the facts that the proportion of
the poorest category increased from 62 to 71 percent of the labor force;
the share of the labor force in the intermediate interval . • • decreased
from 32 to 21 percent between 1960 and 1970; finally, the share of the
labor force in the upper income interval went up from 6 to 8 percent in
the same period."
(2) "Swollen in numbers, from 62 to 71 percent of the working
force, the lowest income earners also increased their share in total income
from 22 to 27 percent.

Proportionally, the increase in numbers was less

than the gains in income; hence the average income of the "poor" went up by
more than the overall average.

But this• • • is a mere statistical artifact."

Beginning with Professor Bacha's first point, the key statement is
the term "equivalent income intervals."

Bacha alleges that the income interval

"less than 2. 1 1960 Cro $" is equivalent to the bracket "less than 99 1970 Cr.$. rr
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To arrive at this conclusion, he used a formula developed in the early work
of Langoni:

(l+n)(l+r),
2

where U i is the upper limit of the i'th income interval, n is the rate of
inflation between 1960 and 1970, and r is the real rate of growth of per
capita gross domestic product between these same years.
(l+n) = 35.32 and r=32%, the value 99 is obtained.

Indeed, with

However, since it is

blown up by (l+r), this figure can hardly be said to define incomes
which are equivalent to one another or to define a constant real poverty
.
1
1 1.ne.

Thus, Bacha's conclusion that the proportion of the poorest

category increased from 62 to 71 percent of the labor forceir is not based
on a constant poverty line and consequently should not be given serious
consideration.
We can, however, recalculate equivalent 1970 income intervals
by dividing each value in Bacha's Table 1, Column 8, by l+r = 1.32, or
equivalently, multiplying the values in Column 1 by 35.32.

Interestingly,

we find that the fourth income bracket terminates at 158 Cr.$, which
conveniently permits comparison with the economically active population
in the first three categories.

According to this calculation, in 1970,

no more than 55.3% of the economically active population had incomes
below 155 Cr._$.

1

(This figure corresponds to 4.5 Cr.$ in 1960.)

The

It is instructive to note that Langoni performed this calculation
only in the preliminary version of his book. Is it possible that the reason
he dropped it was that UZi 196 0(l+n)(l+r) represents greater purchasing power
than U2 i 1 970?

16.

percentage below that figure in 1960 was 62.1%.

Combining these with the

results presented in my paper, we have:

Percentage of economically active
population below 2.1 Cr.$, 1960:

37.0%

Percentage of economically active
population below 2.1 Cr.$, 1970:

35.5%

Percentage of economically active
population below 4.5 Cr.$, 1960:

62.1%

Percentage of economically active
population below 4. 5 Cr.$, 1970:

55.3%

Professor Bacha's assertion that the low income group got larger is thus
refuted regardless of the definition used.
Turning now to Bacha's second point, I would argue that the fact
that the average income of the poor went up is not a statistical artifact,
as he claims.

He presents a simple economy with three persons a, band c

with incomes at time t such that x t> x. > x >x
a

poverty line.

bt

ct

, where xis a constant

Suppose that at time v-1:-t, a positive income transfer from

person b to person a has taken place, so that x

av

> x> x. > x
bV

CV

•

Professor

Bacha notes that although income distribution worsens in this example due
to the regressive transfer, average incomes rise in both income classes.
Thus, an increase in average incomes among the poor could be a statistical
artifact concealing a deteriorating income distribution.

For this reason,

Professor Bacha dismisses as irrelevant both my finding and his finding
that the average income of the poor went up by more than the overall average.
I would argue that the finding is not irrelevant for the very
simple reason that in Professor Bacha's example, the size of the low income
group gets larger, while in the actual data, the low income group becomes
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smaller.

I would challenge him to produce an artifactual example with the

low income group getting smaller and their average incomes rising, yet the
overall income position of the poor deteriorating absolutely.

Since I

cannot think how such a situation could come about, I would maintain my
earlier position that the increase in income share of the lower income
group does reflect an ec.onomically-m eaningful improvement.

VII.

Concluding Points
A-D-P, in their note, raised the possibility of examining

changes in the distribution of income amongst families rather than indiv
iduals.

Fishlow's data did not permit the analysis of families.

In light

of the fact that they and their colleagues at the World Bank have in the
past accepted the legitimacy of Fishlow's conclusions without question, I
didn't think it was necessary to justify the use of Fishlow's data now.
Professor Bacha, I trust, will find that the contributions of
Brazilians and Brazilianists have ·been suitably accounted for in ''Who
Receives the Benefits • • • " [6].

His speculation about the impact of

changes in the distribution of non-cash income merits serious analysis when
and if the data permit, and I too await the results of such a study0
Professor Porter devoted much of his comment to the more general
point that the Gini coefficient may not be an adequate measure of distri
butional change.

His objections are valid ones.

But more fundamentally,

the question is more than just irone more measure showing something else."
At issue is how to translate the general concerns which many of us share for
the distributional consequences of growth into suitable form.

Perhaps the

major lesson from the debate over Brazil is that economic science does not yet
provide a satisfactory answer.

My critics would undoubtedly agree.
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